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The IFRS 8 standard on operating segments was included in the IASB-FASB convergence 
program in February 2006 and subsequently adopted by the IASB in November 2006, in 
spite  of  widespread  negative  sentiment  about  it  among  investors  and  other  users  of 
financial statements, which the IASB should have given attention to but chose to ignore. 
Compared with what is provided under the existing standard IAS 14, the management 
approach on which IFRS 8 is based is not accompanied by sufficient safeguards to ensure 
that segments reflect economic reality and convey a proper understanding of risks. There 
are  no  requirements  to  make  segment  information  consistent  with  consolidated 
information,  which  may  negatively  impact  the  value  of  the  former.  And  geographical 
information is likely to be lost.  
The  Commission’s  Report  on  IFRS 8  does  not  provide an  adequate  basis  for  informed 
decision,  due  to  severe  methodological  flaws  and  insufficient  disclosure  of  feedback 
received by the Commission during the consultation phase. The current process which 
may  lead  to  IFRS  recognition  in  the  United  States  does  not  provide  a  convincing 
argument  to  adopt  IFRS 8  in  view  of  the  standard’s  shortcomings.  To  defend  the 
objective  of  high-quality  standards,  the  European  Union  should  not  adopt  the  current 




This note is intended for use by the Economic and Monetary Affairs (ECON) Committee of 
the  European  Parliament  following  the  presentation  I  was  invited  to  give  on  19 
September  2007,  in  an  open  coordinator  meeting  chaired  by  Joseph  Muscat  MEP  and 
John  Purvis  MEP.  The  note’s  content  is  essentially  the  same  as  my  oral  presentation 
during that meeting, with additional quotes from written sources.  
Bruegel  is  a  European  think  tank  devoted  to  international  economics,  which  started 
operations in Brussels in 2005 with the support of a number of European member state 
governments and international companies. Bruegel aims to contribute to the quality of 
economic policymaking in Europe through open, fact-based and policy-relevant research, 
analysis and discussion. Its current research programme includes a variety of projects, 
including  some  which  specifically  relate  to  capital  markets  and  financial  regulation. 
Detailed information is available on www.bruegel.org.  
My testimony on IFRS 8 is based on several sources, which include my own experience 
as chief financial officer of a publicly-listed company in 2000-2002, which at the time 
reported under French accounting standards and additionally adopted US GAAP for group 
                                                 
1 A list of acronyms is included at the end of this note.  accounting purposes in mid-2001; my experience as a freelance consultant since 2002, 
with several assignments related to financial reporting matters; research underlying the 
publication of a book on accounting with two coauthors, in French in 2004 and in English 
with  extensive  revisions  in  2006
2;  research  at  Bruegel  since  2006,  which  led  to  the 
publication in April 2007 of a policy paper about IFRS adoption
3; numerous discussions 
with  market  participants  since  the  early  2000s  in  a  variety  of  contexts;  and  research 
specifically undertaken for the purpose of this testimony.  
 
IFRS Adoption Background 
The background of the debate over IFRS 8 is the momentous adoption of IFRS in the 
European Union and other jurisdictions around the world since the early 2000s. While the 
international  accounting  standard-setting  organization  (then  known  as  IASC)  was 
established as early as 1973, it is important to remember that the spread of IFRS as a 
publicly-enforced financial reporting language is extremely recent. As recently as 2003, 
only about 5% of the world’s 500 largest listed companies (FT Global 500 sample) used 
IFRS as their primary reporting language, and most were in jurisdictions in which public 
authorities  were  primarily  focused  on  the  enforcement  of  local  accounting  standards 
(‘local GAAP’) rather than IFRS. By contrast, in 2006 as many as 38% of the FT Global 
500 companies used IFRS (as published by the IASB, or as adopted by local jurisdictions) 
as  their  primary  reporting  language.  In  most  of  the  cases,  the  relevant  securities 
regulators had by then become focused on IFRS enforcement. An additional 15% of the 
2006 FT Global 500 reported under systems of accounting standards (such as Canadian 
GAAP, South Korean GAAP or Japanese GAAP) which are set to eliminating differences 
with IFRS in the coming half decade. Meanwhile, the share of the Global 500 reporting 
under US GAAP fell from 53% to 44% between 2003 and 2006, mirroring the declining 
proportion of US-headquartered companies in the sample
4. In a matter of a few years, 
IFRS  has  grown  from  a  relatively  marginal  presence  to  being  the  dominant  financial 
reporting language for global companies.  
The core reason for the IFRS’ spectacular success so far is their orientation towards the 
needs of investors and other users of financial information, which is explicitly stated in 
article 10  of  the  International  Accounting  Standards  Committee’s  1989  Framework  for 
the preparation and presentation of financial statements (or ‘IASB Framework’
5) and has 
been  mostly  maintained  by  the  IASC  until  2001  and  by  the  IASB  since  that  date.  By 
enhancing  the  degree  of  trans-national  and  trans-sectoral  comparability  between 
companies, IFRS have provided a financial reporting language uniquely adapted to the 
needs of investors and other users in a globalizing financial market.  
The  catalyst  for  the  recent  IFRS  spread  has  come  from  the  European  Union,  which 
displayed extraordinary leadership in its decision to adopt IFRS, enshrined into EU law 
through  Regulation  1606/2002  of  July  2002.  This  decision  can  be  argued  as  having 
triggered  or  decisively  facilitated  the  adoption  of  IFRS  in  other  jurisdictions  such  as 
Australia, Norway, Switzerland, Hong Kong, Singapore and China, and soon Israel, Brazil, 
Canada, South Korea or Japan among others – as well as the proposed IFRS recognition 
in  the  United  States  which  is  currently  being  discussed  under  the  aegis  of  the  SEC. 
Moreover, in the European Union the transition from local GAAP to IFRS in 2005-06 has 
been  orderly  and  professionally  managed,  and  a  vast  majority  of  investors  and  other 
users  now  consider  that  IFRS  adoption  and  use  has  brought  significant  progress 
compared  with  the  earlier  situation.  Therefore,  the  success  of  IFRS  so  far  can  be 
attributed both to market (investor) demand, and to EU leadership.  
                                                 
2  L’Information  financière  en  crise  (Odile  Jacob,  2004);  Smoke  &  Mirrors,  Inc.:  Accounting  for  Capitalism 
(Cornell University Press, 2006); co-authored with Matthieu Autret and Alfred Galichon 
3 The Global Accounting Experiment, Bruegel Blueprint series (April 2007), available on www.bruegel.org  
4 I am grateful to Martín Saldías Zambrana at Bruegel for his research assistance in assembling the numbers 
quoted in this paragraph, based on FT Global 500 rankings available on www.ft.com.  
5 The IASB Framework and its translations into European languages are available on www.ec.europa.eu.  However,  these  remarkable  achievements  should  not  hide  the  severe  tensions  that 
remain under the surface, and whose mention is relevant to the debate about IFRS 8.  
One challenge is for the IASB to ensure continued acceptance and legitimacy. Given its 
light  framework  of  governance  and  funding,  maintaining  independence  from  dominant 
influences and accountability to stakeholders is a first-order priority for the international 
standard-setter. Its effectiveness is challenged by the fast-moving financial environment 
and the gaps that still remain in the current set of IFRS, such as on insurance contracts 
or financial statement presentation. Its responsiveness to users’ needs is not a matter of 
consensus, as the case of IFRS 8 illustrates. And the convergence process with US GAAP, 
which  was  given  accelerated  impetus  by  a  memorandum  of  understanding  (MoU) 
between the IASB and the US Financial Accounting Standards Board in February 2006, is 
far  from  universally  accepted  as  an  appropriate  framework  for  setting  the  current 
standard-setting agenda.  
Other challenges relate to endorsement, enforcement and implementation issues. This is 
the  case  in  virtually  all  jurisdictions  that  have  adopted  IFRS,  and  specifically  in  the 
European Union as a consequence of its unique internal diversity. There is no consensus 
among market participants that the current legal and regulatory arrangements will be 
sufficient to bring the level of comparability which had been hoped to result from the 
introduction  of  IFRS,  even  after  the  inevitable  hesitations  of  the  initial  few  years. 
Concerns about the quality of financial reporting under IFRS have not been assuaged. 
Many  see  a  risk  of  fragmentation  of  practices  along  national  lines,  or  of  insufficient 
control  of  assumptions  underlying  complex  measurements  or  model-based  accounting 
entries.  
Even though the use of IFRS has now spread largely beyond Europe, the European Union 
has an important responsibility in managing these tensions and ensuring the success of 
what  is  still,  at  this  point  of  time,  an  experiment.  By  assuming  leadership  in  IFRS 
adoption,  the  EU  has  also  accepted  de  facto  leadership  in  the  endorsement  and 
implementation of the standards, and must now rise to the corresponding obligations. In 




This  section  is  not  meant  as  a  comprehensive  discussion  of  all  accounting  questions 
related to segment information, but as a summary that may be helpful to inform the 
MEPs’ analysis.  
Segment information is one of the most vital aspects of financial reporting for investors 
and other users. As most listed companies are complex, heterogeneous groups, segment 
information  provide  users  the  key  to  understanding  corporate  business  models  and 
economic dynamics. It allows external observers to understand the respective risks and 
value  potentials  of  different  lines  of  business,  the  synergies  or  inefficiencies  that  may 
make  a  group  more  or  less  than  the  sum  of  its  parts,  and  the  underlying  corporate 
strategy.  Segment  reporting  does  not  primarily  pose  measurement  or  recognition 
challenges  and  therefore  tends  not  to  be  a  primary  focus  of  academic  experts  in 
accounting.  But it is no  less  essential  to  users  for  that.  If  anything,  its importance  is 
enhanced by the adoption of IFRS: users find in segment information a real-economy 
depiction  of  a  company’s  operations  which  is  complementary  to  the  complex 
measurements  and  calculations  involved  under  IFRS  in  accounting  for,  say,  goodwill 
impairment or financial instruments.  
Setting standards for segment information is also inherently divisive between preparers 
of financial statements (mostly listed companies) on the one hand, and investors and 
other users on the other hand. Precisely because segment information provides so many 
indications about business models and the economic reality of a company’s operations, 
preparers  generally  desire  to  control  it  tightly,  while  users  want  it  to  be  specifically 
objective and non-distorted. Segment information thus illustrates the tension at the core of the capital markets bargain, by which companies gain access to inexpensive capital in 
exchange  of transparency about their situation and operations. This explains the vivid 
debates on segment reporting standards since the emergence of industrial conglomerates 
in  the  US  in  the  1960s.  Unlike  some  other  accounting  issues,  segment  reporting 
standard-setting has never been a consensual matter.  
Also,  segment  reporting  is  inherently  difficult  to  standardize.  Operating  segments  are 
different from one company to another, and even within the same industry they do not 
necessarily correspond to exactly the same activities. Geographical segments, likewise, 
vary widely, as each company has its own way of considering international markets and 
establishing a presence in them. This explains the variety of approaches which coexist in 
this area.  
Historically,  after  the  initial  attempts  of  the late  1960s  the  first  fully-fledged  segment 
reporting  standard  has  been  SFAS 14  (part  of  US  GAAP),  adopted  by  FASB  in  1976. 
SFAS 14 was mirrored in the corresponding international accounting standard, IAS 14. It 
was based on the so-called industry approach, under which each segment was meant to 
correspond  to  a  broadly  recognized  industrial  sector.  This  approach  was  initially 
developed  for  industrial  conglomerates  such  as  GE  or  ITT,  but  over  time  proved 
inadequate for certain groups, especially those with vertically integrated operations for 
which the industry lens is not the best through which value creation can be observed and 
understood.  Therefore,  in  the  late  1990s  both  FASB  (in  the  US)  and  the  IASC  (at 
international  level)  revised  their  respective  standards.  This  led  to  the  adoption  of 
SFAS 131 in the US, and of the revised international standard, also known as IAS 14, in 
1997. In SFAS 131, FASB adopted the so-called management approach, under which the 
accounting segments shall correspond to the divisions used for management reporting 
purposes inside the company. By contrast, in the revised IAS 14 the IASC adopted the 
so-called  risks-and-rewards  approach,  under  which  the  accounting  segments  shall 
correspond to a meaningful division of a company’s operations in terms of different levels 
of risk and potential of value creation. IFRS 8, adopted by the IASB in November 2006 
(see below), was modeled on SFAS 131 and is very similar to it. As IAS 14 was adopted 
by the European Union in 2003 (regulation 1725/2003), the current discussion on the EU 
adoption of IFRS 8 involves a comparison between IAS 14 and IFRS 8, or between IAS 14 
and SFAS 131 as the latter provides the basis on which IFRS 8 was modeled.  
A  first  set  of  questions  relates  to  the  definition  of  operating  segments  and  to  the 
respective merits of the management approach and the risks-and-rewards approach. Put 
simply,  the  management  approach  has  the  advantage  of  grounding  the  definition  of 
segments in concrete corporate practice, with the risk of it being subject to manipulation 
(because  it  is  ruled  by  managerial  discretion)  or  to  unnecessary  instability  or 
inconsistency due to the vagaries of management fads. The risks-and-rewards approach 
has the advantage of providing objective economic criteria for segment definition, with 
the  risk  of  additional  cost  of  preparing  the  data  (if  it  is  not  readily  available  to 
management) and of disconnect from daily corporate practice. Users generally see value 
in the management approach so long as it does not lead to distortion of the economic 
depiction of operations. The two approaches are far from contradictory. Indeed, IAS 14 
encourages the use of management segments if they meet the test of similar risks and 
rewards.  In  many  cases,  the  two  approaches  may  lead  to  the  same  definition  of 
segments. All the same, it is worth remembering that the aims of financial accounting 
differ fundamentally from those of management accounting, and there is no reason that 
indicators  used  internally  to  measure  performance  and  set  individual  incentives  are 
always the most adequate for external investors to form investment decisions.  
A  second  set  of  questions  relates  to  the  granularity  of  operating  segments,  and 
correspondingly the level of detail provided to users  of financial statements about the 
company’s operations. On this count, IAS 14 and IFRS 8 are similar in their philosophy 
and effects. Neither leads to the disclosure of as many segments as most investors would 
like; and both are resented by small- or medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) which feel that 
their smaller size would justify providing fewer segments than larger corporate entities 
(additional  disclosures  required  by  IFRS 8  are  also  specifically  resented  by  SMEs). However, investors have constantly insisted that as SMEs also may cover a variety of 
different  lines  of  activity,  segment  reporting  is  as  much  justified  for  them  as  for  the 
largest groups.  
A third set of questions relates to the content of segment information, in other words the 
financial disclosures which are made for each segment once defined under one or the 
other  approach.  On  this,  IFRS 8  (as  SFAS 131)  allows  for  much  more  discretion  than 
IAS 14,  which  requires  consistency  with  definitions  of  financial  aggregates  in  the 
consolidated financial statements. By contrast, IFRS 8 allows for inconsistent aggregates, 
e.g. the use of EBITDA or other ‘pro forma’ measures of performance which are not used 
in the consolidated financial statements. From this perspective, IFRS 8 would arguably 
lead to larger difficulties if adopted in the EU than SFAS 131 does in the US, because the 
US have relatively homogeneous national business practices and a single, authoritative 
financial reporting enforcement agency, the SEC. By contrast, EU member states have 
widely diverging traditions of financial reporting and no unity of accounting enforcement, 
which may lead to severe inconsistencies in the content of segment information given the 
low level of safeguards provided by IFRS 8. The risk is to end up with ad hoc segment 
information  which  conveys  much  less  understanding  about  performance  and  risk  than 
what is currently provided under IAS 14.  
A fourth set of questions relates to geographical information. IAS 14 requires a number 
of geographical disclosures by all companies. By contrast, IFRS 8 allows companies to 
avoid providing geographical information on grounds of the cost of producing it. Indeed, 
my  research  practice  at  Bruegel  on  large  global  companies  (much  of  which  relies  on 
listed  companies’  geographical  disclosures
6)  suggests  that  the  quality  of  geographical 
information is generally higher for EU companies using IAS 14 than for US companies 
using SFAS 131. Geographical information is important to financial users to understand 
risks, especially those linked to country or regional factors,  such as those risks which 
materialized during the Asian or Russian crises of the late 1990s. Finally, geographical 
information  is  also  of  high  interest  to  non-financial  stakeholders  such  as  NGOs  or 
corporate social responsibility observers, even though under the IASB Framework their 
needs have less priority than those of financial users for consideration in the standard-
setting process.  
To summarize, each of the two standards (IAS 14 as already adopted by the EU, and 
IFRS 8  as  considered  for  adoption)  has  benefits  and  shortcomings.  Preparers  (listed 
companies)  overwhelmingly  tend  to  have  a  preference  for  IFRS 8,  which  leaves  them 
more  discretion  to  define  segments  and  segment  information  as  they  desire,  imposes 
lower costs for the production of segment data, and restricts the need for geographical 
disclosures which companies are generally reluctant to provide, not least because of their 
potential  politically  sensitive  nature.  Users  (including  investors  among  them) 
overwhelmingly tend to have a preference for IAS 14, which brings them a more reliable 
and  stable  definition  of  segments,  significantly  higher  comparability  and  reliability  of 
segment information, a less distortable basis for valuation and risk assessment, and the 
additional benefit of continuity as it is already implemented by EU companies since 2005. 
Auditors are somewhat divided internally, with technicians tending to prefer IAS 14 but 
commercial and institutional arguments weighing in favour of IFRS 8. The next section 
graphically  attests  this  general  picture,  with  reference  to  both  the  responses  to  the 
consultation on Exposure Draft 8 by the IASB in 2006, and the responses to this year’s 
consultation on IFRS 8 by the European Commission.  
 
IFRS 8 Adoption Process 
In addition to the content of the segment reporting standard, it is relevant for MEPs to 
give consideration to the process under which it was adopted by the IASB and examined 
by the EU. The description of this process illustrates the challenges of users’ involvement 
                                                 
6  See  for  example  Farewell  National  Champions,  Bruegel  Policy  Brief  2006/04  (June  2006),  available  on 
www.bruegel.org.  in accounting standard-setting. Investors and other users of financial statements are the 
key constituency to whose needs the standards are proclaimed to respond, but there is a 
significant  asymmetry  between  the  resources  they  commit  in  the  standard-setting 
process  and  those  of  other  stakeholder  groups.  This  is  significant  as  we  noted  in  the 
previous  section  that  segment  reporting  is  a  matter  on  which  preparers’  and  users’ 
viewpoints may diverge markedly.  
The IASB process (2006) 
The IASB published its exposure draft (ED) on operating segments, or ED8, in early 2006 
just after the conclusion of the already mentioned memorandum of understanding (MoU) 
with FASB on their joint convergence program, which included segment reporting as a 
priority project. The inclusion of segment reporting in the convergence program had been 
controversial inside and outside the IASB and judged by some as unnecessary, because 
segment  reporting  is  about  disclosure  rather  than  measurement  and  recognition,  and 
therefore does not pose major difficulties of reconciliation between different systems of 
standards. Unlike for some other convergence projects which give rise to the drafting of 
new standards by the IASB and FASB jointly, the MoU indicated that the convergence of 
segment reporting would be attained by the alignment of the IFRS on existing US GAAP 
provisions. Thus, ED8 was quickly released as a nearly identical standard to the existing 
SFAS 131.  
It is to be noted that the February 2006 convergence MoU, which has been the dominant 
driver of the IASB’s agenda since then, has itself been submitted to no consultation of 
stakeholders. Only individual projects listed in the convergence program have given rise 
to  consultations  under  the  IASB’s  due  process,  including  ED8  in  the  course  of  2006, 
about which a number of letters were received by the IASB in the spring of 2006 and 
published on the IASB’s website.  
I have reviewed several of these letters, notably those from the big four audit networks, 
the  CFA  Institute  (which  represents  financial  analysts  worldwide),  the  Corporate 
Reporting  User  Forum  (CRUF,  which  assembles  prominent  global  asset  management 
firms),  EFRAG,  Fidelity  International,  HSBC,  the  Institute  of  Chartered  Accountants  of 
England & Wales (ICAEW), the UK Investment Management Association (IMA), HSBC, the 
Quoted  Companies  Alliance  (QCA),  the  Société  Française  des  Analystes  Financiers 
(SFAF), Standard & Poor’s (S&P), and a later letter from George Soros on behalf of the 
Open Society Institute. The picture that emerges is a marked absence of consensus on 
the  timing  of  the  IFRS 8  project,  including  with  consideration  to  the  IASB-FASB 
convergence  program;  the  content  of  the  standard,  including  the  shift  to  the 
management  approach;  and  the  direction  it  means  for  IFRS.  Following  are  selected 
excerpts from some of the most authoritative and representative respondents.  
￿  From the CFA Institute letter, which is based on an extensive empirical survey (18 
May  2006):  “the  current  [ED8]  proposal  will  not  result  in  sufficient  segment 
disclosures”; “convergence with SFAS 131 is premature” and “occurring in the wrong 
direction”;  “unfortunately, it has  been  our  experiences  with  tracking  US  firms  that 
apply SFAS 131, that geographical information for  operating segments is often not 
disclosed. If disclosure is discretionary, then often the information is not provided. In 
the case of geographical information, we believe strongly [their emphasis] that the 
information should be required whether or not it is currently available. As indicated in 
the  2006  survey,  82%  [their  emphasis]  of  respondents  believe  that  geographical 
information  should  be  provided  for  segment  disclosures”;  “Overall,  we  are 
disappointed  in  the  segment  information  currently  available  under  SFAS 131  and 
believe it to be inferior to the information required by IAS 14”.  
￿  From  the  CRUF’s  letter  (19  May  2006):  “we  would  ideally  like  to  see  a  joint 
IASB/FASB  project  to  improve  on  both  standards  rather  than  simply  adopting 
SFAS 131  largely  unchanged.  If  the  IASB  does  not  wish  to  do  this  then  we  would 
agree with the adoption of SFAS 131 only if accompanied by the improvements that 
we outline below” [which were not included in the final version of IFRS 8]; “We do not agree  with  the  level  of  reconciliation  required  in  ED 8.  We  believe  that  the 
reconciliation to GAAP figures should be done at the level of the individual segments”.  
￿  From  Deloitte’s  letter  (12  May  2006):  “Segmental  reporting  is  solely  a  disclosure 
requirement, and so does not affect reconciliations between IFRS and US GAAP. […] If 
the two Boards [IASB and FASB] believe IAS 14 Segment Reporting needs improving, 
they should do so by considering the advantages and disadvantages of both it and 
SFAS 131,  rather  than  converge  to  a  single  standard  that  has  not  proved  to  be 
superior, and we believe to be inferior”; “we believe that the move to ED 8 is not only 
an unnecessary change, but also a step backwards”.  
￿  From  the  EFRAG  letter  (15  June  2006):  “Having  considered  all  these  arguments 
[about  the  choice  of  the  management  approach  by  FASB  in  the  1990s; 
(in)consistency  between  segment  information  and  consolidated  financials; 
(in)consistency between management information and IFRS financial reporting; the 
need  for  giving  precedence  to  the  management’s  view;  and  the  convergence 
program]  carefully,  we  have  not  been  persuaded  that  requiring  the  management 
approach for measuring segment data will, if the convergence effect is ignored, result 
in an improvement of the information provided”. EFRAG then suggests a change to 
the standard which in its view would allow a positive opinion on its endorsement, but 
this change was not subsequently adopted by the IASB in the final version of IFRS 8.  
￿  From the HSBC letter (22 May 2006): “The draft IFRS [8] is a mixture of principles 
and  rules,  however  we  find  the  approach  too  rules-based  and  prescriptive.  We 
understand  that  the  draft  IFRS  is  in  effect  intended  to  bring  in  the  current  US 
approach  to  segmental  reporting  as  part  of  the  convergence  agenda,  but  it  is 
disappointing that the opportunity was not taken to achieve a more effective balance 
of  clear principles with a minimum of detailed rules, in the manner that has been 
achieved with other recent [IFRS] standards. It is necessary for us to add that it is 
disappointing the Board does not seem to appreciate the necessity for a period of 
stability following the initial implementation of IFRS”.  
￿  From the  ICAEW letter (May 2006): “We do  have concerns  with ED 8 as it stands 
(and therefore indirectly with SFAS 131). We believe that ED 8 should be improved at 
this  stage  of  the  convergence  process,  in  so  far  as  these  improvements  are  not 
inconsistent  with  SFAS 131.  We  would  then  urge  the  IASB  and  FASB  to  prioritise 
development of a joint standard on segment reporting”; “segment reporting (…) is 
central  to  providing  an  understanding  of  the  business.  It  should  therefore  be  a 
priority  concern  of  standard  setters.  In  our  view,  ED 8  lacks  a  strong  underlying 
principle that would recognize the importance of segment reporting and underpin a 
robust standard”.  
￿  From the QCA letter (a forum of smaller listed companies, 16 May 2006): “QCA (…) 
believes  (…)  ED8  to  be  an  unwelcome  and  unnecessary  addition  to  the  rapidly 
changing  financial  reporting  regime”;  “SFAS 131  is  a  disclosure  standard  and 
therefore  does  not  affect  the  reconciliation  of  IFRS  amounts  to  US GAAP,  though 
additional  disclosures  might  be  needed  to  comply  with  US  GAAP.  QCA  does  not 
believe therefore that  ED8 is necessary. Additionally QCA questions  the usefulness 
and relevance of a management approach to segmental reporting. We believe that in 
adopting a management approach there is significant risk that information reported 
would  not  be  prepared  in  accordance  with  accepted  GAAP  and  that  summarized 
information would be distorted by the aggregation of unlike items”.  
￿  From  the  Standard  &  Poor’s  letter  (19  May  2006):  “We  are  very  supportive  of 
convergence of global accounting standards and IFRS-US GAAP convergence, but at 
the same time do not believe there is an immediate need in that context, to replace 
IAS 14 with a near replica of SFAS 131”; “simply replacing the existing IAS 14 with 
SFAS 131 is not a solution we support. We appreciate the Board’s desire to eliminate 
IFRS-US GAAP reconciliation differences but segment reporting does not impact the 
reconciling items, as there is already a specific exemption for foreign registrants using 
IFRS (or other home country GAAP) from the requirement to reconcile the segment amounts to US GAAP”; “Segment reporting is a very valuable disclosure for users of 
the financial statements and in an attempt to force convergence the Board should not 
lose the opportunity to enhance the overall quality of segment disclosures”.  
Despite  the  absence  of  consensus  in  favour  of  IFRS 8,  the  IASB  decided  to  adopt  in 
November  as  IFRS 8  a  text  which  was  virtually identical to  ED 8.  Two  full-time  Board 
members,  Gilbert  Gélard  and  James  Leisenring,  expressed  dissent,  “because  [IFRS 8] 
does not require a defined measure of segment profit or loss to be disclosed and does 
not require the measure of profit and loss reported to be consistent with the attribution 
of  assets  to  reportable  segments”.  The  dissenting  opinion  includes  the  comment  that 
“Messrs Gélard and Leisenring also believe that the changes from IAS 14 are not justified 
by the need for convergence with US GAAP. IAS 14 is a disclosure standard and therefore 
does  not  affect  the  reconciliation  of  IFRS  amounts  to  US GAAP,  though  additional 
disclosure  from  what  is  required  now  by  IAS 14  might  be  needed  to  comply  with 
US GAAP”.  
The EU process (2006-07) 
EFRAG’s  report  on  IFRS 8  to  the  European  Commission  was  delivered  on  16  January 
2007 after a brief consultation, part of which was conducted during the holiday period of 
late December 2006. It recommends adoption of IFRS 8 but notes internal dissent and 
that  “some  EFRAG  members  however  remained  unconvinced  that  it  was  an 
improvement”.  EFRAG  was  established  by  the  private  sector  in  2001  and  is  currently 
structured  around  a  Technical  Expert  Group  (TEG)  of  12  voting  members,  of  which 
6 auditors, 4 preparers of financial statements, one academic and one sell-side financial 
analyst.  EFRAG  has  a  User  Panel  of  14  members  but  these  have  no  role  in  TEG 
appointments and do not take part in votes. Therefore, although EFRAG brings together 
high-quality technical expertise, it cannot be considered to represent the voice of users in 
standard-setting discussions.  
Following  EFRAG’s  advice  the  Accounting  Regulatory  Committee  of  the  EU  met  in 
February and unanimously voted in favour of adopting IFRS 8.  
In  early  2007  the  Commission  selected  independent  experts  to  form  the  Standards 
Advisory Review Group (SARG) in order “to ensure objectivity and proper balance of the 
European Financial Reporting Advisory Group's (EFRAG) opinions” and “to assess whether 
the endorsement advice given by the EFRAG is well balanced and objective”. SARG first 
met  on  2 March  2007.  However,  the  Commission  did  not  ask  SARG  to  comment  on 
IFRS 8.  
In the meantime, a number of investor groups and other stakeholders alerted the EU 
institutions about their concerns regarding the adoption of IFRS 8. As a consequence, the 
European  Parliament’s  ECON  Committee  tabled  a  motion  expressing  its  concern  on 
18 April 2007. On 24 April 2007, the Commission sent a letter to the ECON Committee 
Chair,  committing  to  delay  the  enforcement  decision  until  30  September  2007  at  the 
earliest and to carry out further consultations and an impact assessment (following this 
letter the motion was not subjected to a vote by MEPs). The Commission then published 
a  questionnaire  and  collected  responses  from  a  variety  of  stakeholders  groups,  which 
form the main basis for its Report on IFRS 8
7.  
The  European  Commission  deserves  much  praise  for  its  remarkable  work  carried  out 
since  the  late  1990s  to  prepare  and  help  implement  the  EU  decision  to  adopt  IFRS. 
Thanks  to  the  Commission’s  efforts,  the  Regulation  1606/2002,  which  governs  IFRS 
adoption, and subsequent regulations and other texts have been adopted in due time and 
provide  a  strong  basis  for  the  use  of  IFRS  in  the  EU.  Given  these  remarkable 
achievements, it is disappointing that the Commission’s Report on IFRS 8 is based on a 
flawed  approach  to  consultation,  and  fails  to  provide  an  adequate  basis  for  informed 
decision.  
                                                 
7 European Commission, Endorsement of IFRS 8 Operating Segments: Analysis of Potential Effects – Report, 
Ref. MARKT F3 D(2007), 3 September 2007 As explained above, segment reporting is a matter in which the interests and viewpoints 
of investors and other users of financial information may diverge markedly from those of 
preparers  and  other  stakeholders.  The  Commission  implicitly  recognized  this  by 
complementing  its  general  questionnaire  with  subsequent  questionnaires  specifically 
targeted at users on the one hand and preparers on the other hands. The Commission 
also  rightly  describes  criticisms  to  IFRS 8  by  stakeholder  groups  in  section  4.2  of  the 
Report,  when  reporting  on  the  IASB  and  EFRAG  consultations.  It  is  all  the  more 
unfortunate  that  these  viewpoints  are  not  reported  separately  in  the  subsequent 
section 6,  which  presents  the  feedback  received  by  the  Commission  on  its  own 
consultation, even on  questions which were asked separately to preparers on the one 
hand and users on the other hand. The Report systematically uses language such as “the 
majority of commentators consulted by the Commission Services have indicated that” or 
“the  majority  of  respondents  to  our  consultations  believe  that”,  without  indicating  to 
which category of stakeholders these respondents belong.  
Annex  1  of  the  Report  gives  statistics  on  respondents  but  these  include  a  catch-all 
‘Organisations’  category  which  mixes  users,  preparers,  auditors  and  other  stakeholder 
interests.  Furthermore,  the  categorization  is  partly  inaccurate.  For  example,  Annex  7 
shows  Bear  Stearns,  Banca  Carige,  Nordnet  Bank  AB,  or  the  Cyprus  Institute  of 
Chartered Accountants being classified as ‘users’, which does not correspond to generally 
accepted practice. Helpfully, Annex 7 also displays a complete list of 180  respondents 
(numbered  1  to  186)  which  can  be  ranked  as  follows,  using  generally  accepted 
stakeholder categories. Preparers: 94 (52%); NGOs and individuals: 36 (20%); auditors 
and  standard-setters:  31  (17%);  public  institutions  and  universities:  10  (6%); 
investment firms and user groups: 9 (5%). These numbers imply that a point that would 
be  shared  only  by  preparers  could  qualify  as  that  of  “the  majority  of  respondents”. 
Statements such as “the majority of commentators believe that the segment information 
provided under IFRS 8 is more relevant and more useful for users of accounts” (page 17) 
are  technically  accurate  but  could  prove  seriously  misleading.  The  primary  device  for 
understanding  users’  views  should  be  to  look  specifically  at  users’  responses,  even  if 
these are outnumbered by other stakeholders. Other participants’ views on user interests 
could  be  also  reported,  but  as  complementary  information.  As  earlier  expressed,  user 
firms  and  organizations  tend  to  be  much  smaller  and  have  fewer  technical  staff  than 
those which represent the interests of preparers or have dominant commercial links with 
preparers, such as the audit community. This obvious fact should have been taken into 
account by the Commission in its Report.  
The  9  respondents  which  respond  to  usual  characterization  as  users  of  financial 
statements,  outside  the  NGO  community,  are,  in  alphabetical  order  at  listed  by  the 
Commission: EFFAS (the European Federation of Financial Analyst Societies); Eumedion 
(an  organization  of  Dutch  institutional  investors);  Fidelity  Investments  (a  global 
investment  management  firm);  Governance  for  Owners  LLP  (GO),  and  Hermes 
Investment Management Ltd (two investment funds); ICGN (the International Corporate 
Governance  Network,  which  brings  together  institutional  investors  from  around  the 
world); the UK Investment Management Association (IMA); the UK National Association 
of Pension Funds (NAPF); and the Société Française des Analystes Financiers (SFAF)
8. Of 
these nine respondent, seven (EFFAS, Eumedion, GO, Hermes, ICGN, NAPF, SFAF) can 
be  considered  essentially  independent  from  other  stakeholders’  interests,  while  two 
(Fidelity  and  IMA)  depend  on  preparers  for  a  significant  share  of  their  client  base  (in 
IMA’s case, of the client and shareholder base of its member firms).  
Seven  of  the  nine  letters  from  investment  firms  and  user  groups  are  overwhelmingly 
critical of IFRS 8. The remaining two are Fidelity, which recommends endorsement, and 
IMA, which changed its stance from negative in March 2007 to positive (although with 
lingering reservations) in June. Following are selected excerpts from the letters.  
                                                 
8 I am a member of the ICGN’s Accounting and Auditing Practices Committee, and I attend the meetings of the 
SFAF’s Accounting and Financial Analysis Committee. However, I did not take any leading role in drafting the 
ICGN’s and SFAF’s respective contributions in the Commission’s consultation on IFRS 8.  ￿  From  the  EFFAS  letter  (29  June  2007):  “Regarding  the  relevance  of  the  published 
segment information, IFRS 8 seems to imply that the geographical breakdown is of 
much  less  importance.  Actually,  in  several  occasions  (Asian  or  Russian  crisis…), 
geographic  information  turned  out  to  be  the  most  important  one.  In  those  cases, 
moving  from  IAS 14  to  IFRS 8  will  clearly  suppress  the  relevant  information”; 
“Providing information in the management approach will allow two companies with 
identical businesses to have different segments for reporting just because they are 
organised or managed in different ways. Identifying segments on the basis of similar 
risk  and  reward  should  avoid  this  situation:  companies  with  identical  businesses 
should  report  identical  segments.  Lastly,  we  believe  that  segments  based  on 
management vision will inevitably change more often segment definition than with a 
definition of segments based on similar risk and rewards”; “Moving from IAS 14 to 
IFRS 8 will thus reduce considerably the comparability of segment information, which 
would be a considerable loss for users of financial information”; “on the longer term, 
it [replacing IAS 14 with IFRS 8] will make analysts less comfortable with segment 
reporting information and will result in valuations with discounts”.  
￿  From  the  Eumedion  letter  (29  June  2007):  segment  information  “is  undeniably  of 
increasing  importance”;  “In  converging  standards,  quality  should  be  the  decisive 
factor. Where there is no agreement between the regulators and/or endorsers, reason 
should  prevail.  In  those  instances,  it  is  better  to  have  two  standards  which  are 
considered  equivalent  than  one  standard,  perceived  –  at  least  by  an  important 
segment of the users – as being of lower quality”.  
￿  From the Fidelity letter (not dated): “The key for us as shareholders in looking at the 
standards  for  financial  statements  is  the  core  principle  in  IFRS:  ‘An  entity  shall 
disclose information to enable users of its financial statements to evaluate the nature 
and financial effects of the business activities in which it engages and the economic 
environments  in  which  it  operates.’  Provided  that  IFRS 8  is  implemented  in  a  way 
which is consistent with this principle, then we believe that the European Commission 
should endorse IFRS 8”.  
￿  From the Governance for Owners letter (29 June 2007): “We are also concerned that 
the  information  prepared  under  IFRS 8  would  not  be  as  reliable,  comparable  or 
understandable  as  that  prepared  under  IAS 14”;  “Of course,  we  are  focusing  on  a 
minority  of  companies  that  are  probably  trying  to  conceal  poor  performance.  But 
these  are  exactly  the  companies  that  will  exploit loopholes.  It  seems  to  us  that it 
would  be  much  easier  to  misapply  IFRS 8  than  IAS 14  and  thus  misrepresent 
business activities”; “In summary, we believe that the ‘management approach’ taken 
in IFRS 8 has some merit but that as drafted the standard allows too much discretion 
with too few checks on executive management”.  
￿  From the Hermes letter (not dated): “We believe that there is a negative cost/benefit 
balance  from  a  shift  from  IAS 14  to  IFRS 8  because  there  is  a  minimal  cost 
differential  but  – unless  the  appropriate  checks  and  balances  are  put in  place  –  a 
significant reduction in benefits”.  
￿  From the first ICGN letter (9 May 2007): “IFRS 8 removes the risk and reward criteria 
that are in IAS 14 for assessing the sufficiency of information that is presented (or 
not  presented)  to  shareowners  and  public  markets,  and  also  in  the  wider  public 
interest.  IFRS 8  also  removes  geographical  segmentation,  which  is  undoubtedly 
important for investors”; “The risk with IFRS 8 is not about strong companies, but 
about  those  that  have  management  who  are  not  delivering,  or  have  something  to 
hide, which could then be passively assented to by non-executives and auditors due 
to the prescription of the standard allowing it”. From the second IFRS letter (29 June 
2007): “The ICGN does not believe that convergence itself is a sufficient objective to 
justify replacing a superior standard with a less effective one if there is any threat to 
investment returns or investor protection. Convergence should occur by attaining the 
highest  quality.  Overall,  IAS 14  is  a  stronger  standard  in  respect  of  identifying 
business risk and financing risk, and then disclosing this”; “We recommend the EU keep  IAS 14  as  the  endorsed  standard  until it  can  be  demonstrated  that  a  clearly 
improved standard should be implemented”.  
￿  From the first IMA letter (9 March 2007): “we believe it would be premature for the 
Commission  to  consider  endorsing  IFRS 8  and  US  requirements  for  segmental 
reporting,  and  that  it  should  defer  such  a  decision  until  these  matters  have  been 
further progressed and a better consensus achieved”. From the second IMA letter (29 
June 2007): “from the perspective of our members as investors in major companies 
whose securities are traded on regulated markets, IMA has certain reservations which 
were set out in our letter to the Commission dated 9 March 2007. While we continue 
to have these reservations, we do not believe that they should stand in the way of 
the  broader  aim  of  convergence  and  in  particular,  the  proposed  consultation 
announced by the SEC on 24 April 2007 on changes to its rules to allow the use of 
IFRS in financial reports filed by foreign private issuers registered with the [Securities 
and Exchange] Commission”.  
￿  From the first NAPF letter (15 March 2007): “in addition to the specific weaknesses, 
the thinking behind IFRS 8 is a harmful precedent for any standard. […] Convergence 
should be about maintaining standards and preferably raising them. In this instance 
we see standards potentially lowered, to the detriment of shareholders”; “The IASB 
has said that IFRS 8 will not need to be adopted until 2009. In view of the fact that 
the  convergence  path  may  well  change,  given  the  SEC’s  planned  review,  it  would 
seem wise for the EU not to adopt IFRS at this time”. From the second NAPF letter 
(3 July 2007): “Since the NAPF wrote to the Commission on IFRS 8 [on 15 March], it 
is  now  clearer  to  us  that  the  governance  principles  underpinning  IFRS 8  may  be 
contrary to the principles and the requirements set out in Directive 2006/46/EC, for 
financial information and non-financial information applying to all EU member states. 
The  NAPF  is  also  concerned  with  the  lack  of  objective  economic  risk  and  reward 
criteria  in  IFRS 8,  whether  it  means  that  businesses  may  be  obscured  by 
amalgamation,  or  in  some  circumstances  being  a  contributory  factor  to  not  being 
consolidated at all”.  
￿  From the SFAF letter (28 June 2007): “We consider that the management approach is 
much less relevant, reliable, comparable, understandable and useful than information 
prepared  under  IAS 14”;  “We  consider  that  IFRS 8  is  not  an  improvement  versus 
IAS 14. Maintaining IAS 14, as this standard has been used by quoted companies for 
over  two  years,  should  not  be  a  cost/benefit  issue.  From  our  point  of  view,  the 
benefits  associated  to  the  implementation  of  IFRS 8  are  much  lower  than  with 
IAS 14”;  “We  consider  that  a  well  documented  segment  information  on  a 
geographical basis is missing in IFRS 8”.  
These  are  substantial,  diverse  views,  which  overwhelmingly  contradict  the  view 
expressed  by  “the  majority  of  commentators”  in  the  Commission’s  consultation, 
according to which “the segment information provided under IFRS 8 is more relevant and 
more  useful  for  users  of  accounts”.  It  is  regrettable  that  the  Report  does  not  display 
them  in  a  meaningful  way,  and  instead  exclusively  uses  a  quantitative  approach  of 
counting responses which does not reflect the diversity of stakeholders. Of course, the 
point of view of preparers of financial statements is a legitimate one in the debate about 
segment reporting, but in the interest of standards quality it should not form the sole 
basis for policy decision.  
It is also unfortunate that the Commission did not publish the responses it received on its 
website at the same time as it published its own Report on IFRS 8. By acting so, the 
Commission  did  not  comply  with  best  practices  of  market  consultation.  I  thank  the 
Commission for gracefully providing me some of the contributions quoted above, at my 
request  after  the  presentation  on  19  September.  But  the  broader  public  should  have 
been allowed to read them as well and in due time.  
 The Transatlantic Context 
Because  segment  reporting  is  about  disclosure,  in  the  notes  attached  to  the  financial 
statements rather than in the financial statements themselves, it does not feature high in 
discussions related to reconciliation between different systems of accounting standards. 
For companies with dual listing, it is actually most often possible to produce segment 
information which is consistent with both IAS 14 and SFAS 131, or which requires only 
minor  reconciliation  adjustments.  Therefore,  the  sometimes  heard  argument  that  not 
adopting  IFRS 8  would  create  significant  reconciliation  problems  is  overblown.  Indeed, 
the  fact  that  segment  reporting  is  about  disclosure  and  not  about  recognition  or 
measurement  leads  to  question  why  it  has  been  included  as  a  priority  project  in  the 
IASB-FASB February 2006 MoU on convergence at all, as illustrated by comments from 
various market participants (see quotes in the previous section, e.g. Deloitte, QCA, S&P) 
and  by  the  already  quoted  dissenting  opinion  of  Gilbert  Gélard  and  James  Leisenring 
within  the  IASB.  Standard  &  Poor’s  actually  indicates  that  “there  is  already  a  specific 
exemption  for  foreign  registrants  using  IFRS  (or  other  home  country  GAAP)  from  the 
requirement to reconcile the segment amounts to US GAAP”, although I have not had the 
opportunity to verify the exact form of this apparently existing exemption.  
Moreover, the previous section illustrates that concerns about IFRS 8 are not limited to 
European stakeholders, but are shared by many users across the Atlantic. The previously 
quoted  letters  from  the  CFA  Institute  and  the  International  Corporate  Governance 
Network,  perhaps  the  two  most  authoritative  organizations  that  represent  users  of 
financial information at global level, were both signed by executives based in the United 
States. And James Leisenring, one of the two IASB dissenters on IFRS 8, is well known in 
the accounting community for frequently heralding ‘American’ views in standard-setting 
debates. When he states that “the changes from IAS 14 are not justified by the need for 
convergence with US GAAP. IAS 14 is a disclosure standard and therefore does not affect 
the reconciliation of IFRS amounts to US GAAP”, his voice carries weight.  
Several participants have expressed the view that if the EU chose not to adopt IFRS 8 
shortly,  it  would  endanger  the  process  of  IFRS  recognition  which  is  underway  in  the 
United States.  In 2005, the SEC agreed on a ‘roadmap’ to  eliminate by 2009 the so-
called  reconciliation  requirement,  under  which  foreign  issuers  currently  must  reconcile 
(explain  the  differences  in)  their  financial  statements  with  US GAAP,  for  those  issuers 
which report their financials using IFRS. On 30 April 2007, at a Transatlantic summit in 
Washington DC, accounting standards were mentioned by José Barroso in the presence 
of George Bush and Angela Merkel as being part of a high-level Transatlantic regulatory 
convergence agenda, as SEC Chairman Christopher Cox had publicly emphasized the day 
before. On 20 June 2007, the SEC approved for public comment a proposal to accept 
financial statements from foreign issuers using IFRS without having to reconcile them to 
US GAAP. In addition, on 7 August 2007 the SEC published a concept release requesting 
comment on whether US issuers should also be allowed to publish financial statements 
using IFRS rather than US GAAP.  
But this sequence of events illustrates the robustness of the process by which the SEC 
may recognise IFRS, rather than its fragility. In fact, the spectacular steps forward made 
in 2007 came just after the European Commission decided to delay the decision-making 
process on IFRS 8 on 24 April 2007, following the expression of concern by MEPs. The US 
authorities  are  perfectly  informed  of  European  developments  and  have  nevertheless 
decided  to  proceed.  Indeed,  because  segment  reporting  (for  the  above  mentioned 
reasons) is not a contentious reconciliation item, the fact that it is adopted or not in the 
EU  is  unlikely  to  have  a  significant  influence  on  the  mutual  recognition  discussion  – 
unlike,  say,  the  2004  EU  carve-out  in  IAS 39,  or  possible  future  controversies  on  the 
accounting treatment of business combinations.  
Actually, the opposite view could be defended. The biggest risk to IFRS recognition in the 
US is not a failure by the EU to adopt all standards, but a perception that IFRS are not 
standards of the highest quality. In this respect, the actual decrease in quality, which in 
my opinion is brought by replacing IAS 14 with IFRS 8, may do more harm than good to the long-term prospects of IFRS accounting in the United States. Congress has so far 
been non-committal about the Executive Branch’s and the SEC’s initiatives on accounting 
standards convergence. But there is always a risk of this discussion acquiring a political 
dimension, especially at a time when Congress and the Executive Branch do not share 
the same orientation. If congressional democrats were to intervene in accounting, they 
would be likely to do so on behalf of investors’ interests, and from this point of view the 
replacement of IAS 14 with IFRS 8 would not weigh in positively for IFRS.  
Ultimately, the European position in the Transatlantic debate on convergence and mutual 
recognition  is  best  served  by  adopting  the  highest-quality  standards  in  the  EU,  and 
ensuring high-quality implementation as well – a matter not directly related to IFRS 8 but 
which  should  also  feature  high  among  European  policymakers’  priorities
9.  This  is 
evidenced  by  the  original  ‘Roadmap’  document  of  2005,  in  which  then  SEC  Chief 
Accountant  Donald  Nicolaisen  outlines  the  philosophy  and  criteria  of  eventual  IFRS 
recognition in the United States
10.  
As  a  consequence,  and  in  spite  of  the  often  heard  argument,  my  opinion  is  that 
convergence  and  US  recognition  of  IFRS  are  not  compelling  arguments  in  favour  of 
adoption  of  IFRS 8  in  the  EU,  especially  when  weighed  against  the  significant 
shortcomings of IFRS 8 compared with the presently applicable standard IAS 14.  
 
Timing considerations 
It is sometimes argued that the EU should urgently make a decision in favour of IFRS 8. 
However, I see no reason to rush towards a decision. Unlike, say, reporting for insurance 
contracts  (for  which  the  current  standard  IFRS 4  is  explicitly  transitional  and 
unsatisfactory when weighed against the IASB Framework and the objectives set out in 
Regulation 1606/2002), segment reporting is already covered by an existing standard, 
IAS 14, which is certainly not perfect but far from low-quality. Moreover, implementation 
of IAS 14 has only recently started and for the sake of high-quality financial reporting, it 
would be beneficial to let practice under IAS 14 stabilise over the next few years. This 
would also be beneficial to users, for which yet another change of standards in a short 
period of time would create unnecessary difficulties in analyzing and understanding the 
information disclosed by companies.  
Furthermore,  IFRS 8  is  in  any  event  not  meant  as  the  final  standard  on  segment 
reporting.  Actually,  it  has  become  clear  this  year  that  the  project  on  ‘Financial 
Statements  Presentation’  (previously  known  as  ‘Performance  Reporting’,  on  how  to 
present  financial  statements  in  order  best  to  display  companies’  situation  and 
performance) would include wide-ranging changes in segment information. This project 
had been frozen for some time and has only recently been revived under the leadership 
of  FASB.  It  is  likely  that  the  debates  on  Financial  Statements  Presentation  will  last 
several years before the corresponding new IFRS standard is adopted by the IASB. But it 
also means that, were the EU not to adopt IFRS 8, this would not create a permanent 
difference with IFRS as published by the IASB. Supposing the new Financial Statements 
Presentation standard, which may be ready early in the next decade, is of high quality 
and is adopted by the EU, the difference created by the non-adoption of IFRS 8 will have 
been temporary, and to the benefit of the quality of financial reporting in the EU.  
 
                                                 
9 I discuss the issue of IFRS implementation in Europe at length in The Global Accounting Experiment (Bruegel, 
April 2007). In this essay, I suggest setting up a European Accounting Agency or European Chief Accountant, 
which would be in charge of ensuring consistency in implementation across borders between different European 
countries, and of issuing relevance guidance to reach this aim. Such a reform would also strengthen Europe’s 
voice in global accounting debates and would reinforce the sustainability of IFRS adoption in the EU.  
10  Donald  Nicolaisen,  “A  Securities  Regulator  Looks  at  Convergence”,  published  in  Northwestern  Journal  of 
International Law and Business, 25 (3), April 2005 Policy Recommendation 
In  accounting discussions  and  decisions,  the  highest  objective  of  the  EU  should  be  to 
defend  high-quality  standards  for  investors  and  other  users.  This  has  been  the  driver 
behind  the  adoption  of  IFRS  since  2002,  which  so  far  has  represented  a  uniquely 
successful assertion of leadership by the European Union. By contrast, were standard-
setting not primarily driven by this quality objective, the very rationale for IFRS adoption 
would be threatened.  
The  IASB  has  generally  been  effective  in  producing  high-quality  standards,  but  has 
lapsed in the case of IFRS 8, as is well illustrated by generally negative user sentiment 
about this standard. While the reasons for this lapse are not  entirely clear, they may 
include the willingness to give precedence to short-term convergence with US GAAP over 
standards  quality  in  the  eyes  of  investors  and  other  users.  This  is  not  in  the  best 
interests of users and of the IFRS project itself, which critically depends on user support.  
One  could  argue  (and several  market  participants  have  suggested)  that  the  European 
Union  should  adopt  IFRS 8  for  the  sake  of  convergence,  and  then  issue  additional 
requirements to correct that standard’s weaknesses. These could include a test to ensure 
that the definition of segments is economically relevant; a requirement for consistency 
between segment information and consolidated financial statements; and a requirement 
for  meaningful  geographical  information.  However,  under  the  current  EU  institutional 
setting it is difficult to see which EU authority could achieve this. Especially, CESR does 
not  yet  have  a  track  record  of  issuing  authoritative  financial  disclosure  requirements, 
which have traditionally been in the hands of national securities regulators. Therefore, 
while this option has attractions, I do not see how it could be effectively implemented in 
the  short  term,  and  I  do  not  think  IFRS 8  should  be  adopted  without  such  additional 
requirements.  
In most advanced economies, it is not usually the role of Parliament to intervene directly 
in  accounting  standard-setting  decisions.  However,  EU  arrangements  have  given  the 
European  Parliament  a  voice  in  the  IFRS  adoption  process.  In  my  opinion,  this  voice 
should be used actively only in (hopefully) rare cases when all other actors in the chain 
of decision-making have failed to defend the objective of high-quality standards in the 
interests of users of financial information. It is my opinion that IFRS 8 presents such a 
case.  
The EU has assumed crucial leadership by triggering the worldwide adoption of IFRS. It 
must  rise  to  the  corresponding  responsibility  by  defending  the  objectives  of  IFRS 
standard-setting. Adoption decisions are one of the main tools in the EU’s hands to that 
aim (the other main tool would be to ensure consistent implementation of IFRS within 
the  EU  and  thus  prove  that  the  IFRS’  promise  of  comparability  is  credible).  The  tool 
provided by the adoption mechanism under Regulation 1606/2002 should not be used 
lightly, but nor should it be considered irrelevant. It should not be used for defensive 
purposes  or  the  protection  of  special  local  interests,  but  for  the  benefit  of  the  entire 
community by ensuring that any temptation to compromise on standards quality is met 
vigilantly and firmly.  
As  a  consequence,  my  recommendation  is  for  the  European  Union  not  to  adopt  the 
current version of IFRS 8.  
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CESR    Committee of European Securities Regulators 
CFA    Certified Financial Analyst 
CRUF    Corporate Reporting User Forum 
DC    District of Columbia 
EBITDA  Earnings before Interest, Tax, Depreciation and Amortization 
ECON    Economic and Monetary Affairs Committee of the European Parliament  
EFFAS   European Federation of Financial Analyst Societies 
EFRAG   European Financial Reporting Advisory Group 
EU  European Union 
FASB    Financial Accounting Standards Board of the US 
GAAP    Generally Accepted Accounting Principles 
GO    Governance for Owners LLP 
IAS    International Accounting Standards 
IASB    International Accounting Standards Board (since 2001) 
IASC    International Accounting Standards Committee (1973-2001). The acronym 
remains in use by the IASC Foundation, created in 2001 
ICGN  International Corporate Governance Network 
ICAEW    Institute of Chartered Accountants of England and Wales 
IFRS    International Financial Reporting Standards 
IMA    Investment Management Association 
MEP    Member of the European Parliament 
MoU    Memorandum of Understanding 
NAPF    UK National Association of Pension Funds 
QCA    Quoted Companies Alliance 
S&P    Standard & Poor’s 
SARG    EU Standards Advisory Review Group 
SEC    US Securities and Exchange Commission 
SFAF  Société  Française  des  Analystes  Financiers  (French  Society  of  Financial 
Analysts) 
SFAS  Statement of Financial Accounting Standard: denomination of some of the 
rules that collectively form US GAAP  
SMEs    Small and Medium-sized Enterprises 
TEG    Technical Expert Group (within EFRAG) 
UK    United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland 
US    United States of America 
 